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1. Introduction 
The use of information has become a pervasive part of our daily life; we have become “… an 
information society” (Gordon & Gordon, 1996). Employees use information to make 
personal choices and perform basic job functions; managers require significant amounts of it 
for planning, organizing and controlling; corporations leverage it for strategic advantage. 
Since the application of computers in administrative information processing began in 1954 
(Davis & Olson, 1985), computers have become a key instrument in the development of 
information processing. The rapid development of information technology (IT) has helped 
to firmly establish the general attitude that information systems are a powerful instrument 
for solving problems. 
Utilizing these emerging technologies, however, is not without problems. People start 
considering their sensitive information when it is transmitted through open networks; 
managers begin worrying about using forged information for business plans; and 
corporations worry about customer and investor confidence if they fail to protect sensitive 
information. Protecting sensitive information has consequently become a top priority for 
organizations of all sizes. 
Despite this priority, the majority of existing sensitive information systems (Bacon & 
Fitzgerald, 2001; Bhatia & Deogun, 1998; Hong et al., 2007) focus on performance and 
precision of data retrieval and information management. A number of techniques are 
employed to protect information systems; however, in many cases, these techniques are 
proving inadequate.  For example, while several information systems (Beimel et al., 1999; 
Cachin et al., 1999; Gertner et al., 1998; Gertner et al., 2000) use the add-ons security features 
to provide information confidentiality (which allow users to share information from a data 
media while keeping their channel private), these security measures are insufficient.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The Architecture of Generic Sensitive Information Systems 
As shown in Fig.1, generic sensitive information systems consist of - communication channel, 
user interface and sensitive information storage - three major components, and they are all 
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potential targets for adversaries wanting to benefit from security weaknesses. Therefore, in 
following sections, existing approaches, main issues and limitations relating to sensitive 
information protection are investigated.   
1.1 Related work and limitations  
According to the process of sensitive information retrieving, several security aspects need to 
be studied. Firstly, securing communication channel, it applies cryptography and security 
tunnels to protect message between entities. Secondly, securing user interface, it uses 
authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information. 
Thirdly, securing sensitive information storage, it uses cryptographic keys to encrypt all 
sensitive information before storing it.  
1.1.1 Securing communication channel 
In cryptography, a confidential channel is a way of transferring data that is resistant to 
interception, but not necessarily resistant to tampering. Conversely, an authentic channel is 
a way of transferring data that is resistant to tampering but not necessarily resistant to 
interception (Tienari & Khakhar, 1992). Interception and tampering resistance is best 
developed through communication channel.  
In order to reach the interception resistance goal, all communication is scrambled into 
ciphered text with a predetermined key known to both entities to prevent an eavesdropper 
from obtaining any useful information. In order to achieve the tampering resistance goal, a 
message in a communication is assembled using a credential such as an integrity-check to 
prevent an adversary from tampering with the message. 
In this section, the different approaches of securing communication channel are 
investigated, and their pros and cons are evaluated. The investigation is conducted by 
subdividing communication channel into unicast channel and multicast channel 
Secure Communication in Unicast Channels: With the recent development of modern 
security tools to secure bidirectional communication between two entities, many protocols, 
such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) (Atkinson, 1995), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) (Dierks & Rescorla, 2008; Freier et al., 1996) and Secure Real-
time Transport Protocol (SRTP) (Lehtovirta et al., 2007), have been proposed in the literature 
to address the problems and challenges of a secure unicast communication channel. One of the 
most important factors in unicast communication channel protection is the cryptographic key.  
The issues of key distribution and key type, therefore, determine the security of the unicast 
communication channel.  
IPsec and SSL/TLS are the most famous, secure and widely deployed among all the 
protocols for protecting data over insecure networks. IPsec is a suite of protocols for 
protecting communications over Internet Protocol (IP) networks through the use of 
cryptographic security services. It supports network-level peer authentication, data origin 
authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality (encryption), and replay protection. 
However, in IPsec, communication is protected by session keys, and the security of a session 
key is guaranteed by long-term shared keys. Therefore, once the long-term keys are 
compromised, the security of IPsec is under threat. As Perlman and Kaufman (2001) 
indicated, IPsec is vulnerable to dictionary attack, due to the pre-shared long-term keys, and 
Ornaghi and Valleri (2003) demonstrated it in a BlackHat conference.  
Moreover, in IPsec, the long-term shared keys involve into key exchange protocol to 
generate session keys. According to information entropy (Gray, 1990), the uncertainty of key 
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materials decreases when the use of the key materials in generation session keys is frequent. 
This leads to the key materials (that is, the long-term shared keys) being exposed.  
SSL/TLS are cryptographic protocols that provide security and data integrity for unicast 
communications over insecure networks to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message 
forgery by employing pre-shared master secret (long-term shared key). That the master 
secret remains truly secret is important to the security of SSL/TLS. However, in the protocol 
design, the usage of master secret involves multiple phases, such as session key generation, 
certificate verification and cipher spec change (Wagner & Schneier, 1996).  
On the top of the above concerns, the SSL/TLS protocols suffer from different types of flaws 
(Micheli et al., 2002): identical cryptographic keys are used for message authentication and 
encryption, and no protection for the handshake, which means that a man-in-the-middle 
downgrade attack can go undetected. Although a new design of SSL/TLS overcomes a few 
flaws, as (Bard, 2004; Wagner & Schneier, 1996) state, an attacker can use plaintext attacks to 
break SSL/TLS protocols due to the long-term shared identical cryptographic keys. 
Secure Communication in Multicast Channels: As group-oriented communication systems 
become more widespread, sensitive information confidentiality is an issue of growing 
importance for group members. To achieve confidential communication in a multicast 
channel, cryptographic keys are employed to secure the multicasted contents. The keys (or 
the group key) must be shared only by group members. Therefore, group key management 
is important for secure multicast group communication. In modern group key management 
- Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) (Harney & Harder, 1999), One-way Function Tree (OFT) 
(Sherman & McGrew, 2003), Iolus (Mittra, 1997) - for sensitive information systems requires 
group keys to have a number of characteristics: group key secrecy, backward secrecy, 
forward secrecy and group key independency. In addition, modern management also 
requires flexible and efficient rekeying operations and privacy for group members (Kim et 
al., 2004).  
However, Challal and Seba (2005) imply that the major problems of group key management 
are confidentiality, authentication and access control. Also, there are no solutions to dedicate 
privacy protection for group members and confidentiality for sensitive information systems. 
Moreover, when a user joins a group, the new group keys are unicast to the user encrypted 
by a pre shared long-term key. It raises risks of sensitive information systems associated 
with the compromise of the long term key. 
1.1.2 Securing user interface 
The common security mechanism to protect user interface in sensitive information systems is 
authentication. Authentication is “the process of confirming or denying a user’s claimed 
identity, which can be proved by knowledge, possession and property factors” (Meyers, 
2002). This form of security uses measures such as security tokens (something users have), 
passwords (something users know) or biometric identifiers (something users are).  
Kerberos (Steiner et al., 1988) is a representative knowledge factor based authentication 
protocol which allows individuals communicating over a non-secure network to prove their 
identity to one another in a secure manner. In the original design of Kerberos, session keys 
exchange used long-term shared keys. Although researchers (Erdem, 2003; Harbitter & 
Menascé, 2001; Sirbu & Chuang, 1997) proposed the use of public key cryptography to 
enhance security for key exchange and authentication, the long-term shared key is still a 
limitation of Kerberos-based information systems (Kohl et al., 1994).  In 2008, Cervesato et 
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al. (2008) pointed out that man-in-the-middle attack can breach Kerberos-based information 
systems. 
Other authentication factors based authentication protocols suffer security threats when the 
physical devices (security tokens and smart card) are lost or stolen or the biometric sources 
(fingerprint and retinal pattern) are compromised. Moreover, privacy is another concern; 
how biometrics, once is collected, can be protected.  
By briefly investigating the extant authentication approaches in sensitive information 
systems, there is no proper technique to protect user interface in the process of sensitive 
information retrieving. Moreover, the extant authentication approaches are not able to 
manage dynamic group member authentication and authorization while allowing 
individuals to share their sensitive information without sacrificing privacy. 
1.1.3 Securing sensitive information storage 
Data encryption is a security mechanism to protect sensitive information at rest. It depends 
on a long-term shared key to cipher all critical information at rest (sensitive information 
storage). For example, IBM employs symmetric keys in z/OS to protect the sensitive 
information documents, and uses public keys to wrap and unwrap the symmetric data keys 
used to encrypt the documents. With this technique, IBM claims that many documents can 
be generated using different encryption keys (Boyd, 2007).  
Similar mechanisms are also used for Oracle Database and Microsoft SQL Server, which 
conduct critical information protection via long-term shared keys. The security of the IBM 
mechanisms relies on public key infrastructure; if the public key pairs are disclosed, no 
matter how many different encryption keys are used to protect information, the whole 
information system will be compromised. In addition, the security of Oracle and Microsoft 
mechanisms depend on a long-term database master key; the sensitive information may be 
revealed if the database systems are breached.  
It can be seen that no technique can ensure privacy protection, and also that the security of 
those techniques relies on long-term keys and public keys. Also, none of the existing 
approaches to protecting information storage can manage dynamic ownership of sensitive 
information (for example, in the case that a user loses the asymmetric key in z/OS or that 
the ownership of sensitive information is changed in a database).  
1.1.4 Summary 
Sensitive information systems consist of three major components: communication channel, 
user interface and sensitive information storage; the protection of these three components 
equates to the protection of sensitive information itself. Previous research in this area has 
been limited due to the employment of long-term shared keys and public keys. Currently, 
no complete security solution exists to help protect sensitive information in the three 
components. Issues such as dynamic sensitive information ownership, group authentication 
and authorization and privacy protection also create challenges for the protection of 
sensitive information systems.  
In response to these limitations, we therefore propose a novel security architecture for 
sensitive information systems to tackle the problems and challenges. 
1.2 Organization of the chapter and contributions 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes formal security 
architecture for sensitive information systems. Section 3 details the components of the 
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proposed secure architecture. Section 4 gives a formal and thorough security analysis and 
discussion of the components. Section 5 concludes and provides future researcher 
directions. 
Contributions: This research contributes to the development of the body of knowledge 
surrounding sensitive information protection. Its contributions include the following:  
- Formal definition and cryptographic properties proofs of dynamic keys 
This thesis offered a first formal definition of dynamic keys with the following proved 
cryptographic properties: dynamic key secrecy, former key secrecy, key collision 
resistance and key consistency. The formal definition and the cryptographic properties 
can also be used as a guide to design new dynamic key generation algorithms. More 
importantly, the formal definition gives a distinct semantic notion to distinguish 
dynamic keys from other cryptographic keys, such as session keys, one-time pad and 
long-term keys. 
- A new proposed security architecture for sensitive information systems 
This research proposed a novel security architecture by the employment of dynamic 
key and group key theories to overcome the security threats and concerns of sensitive 
information systems in the components of communication channel, user interface and 
sensitive information storage. The architecture can be applied to security applications all 
sectors, including the business, healthcare and military sectors, to protect sensitive 
information.  
As a result of these contributions, we claim that the proposed security architecture for 
sensitive information systems protects communication channel, user interface and sensitive 
information storage. The architecture provides strong authentication and authorization 
mechanisms to conduct dynamic membership of groups and individuals to share or access 
sensitive information. It also prevents legal users accessing unauthorized sensitive 
information against internal security threats. The architecture achieves strong protection for 
sensitive information at rest in order to overcome security threats that compromise 
credentials of information systems.  Furthermore, it is able to handle dynamic information 
ownership. Finally, the proposed architecture achieves privacy protection and includes a 
feature to detect and prevent intrusion. 
2. Security architecture for Sensitive Information Systems (SecureSIS) 
2.1 Dynamic key theory 
A dynamic key is a single-use symmetric key used for generating tokens and encrypting 
messages in one communication flow. Each key is a nonce, which stands for number used 
once (Anderson, 2001). The use of dynamic keys introduces complications, such as key 
synchronization, in cryptographic systems. However, it also helps with some problems, 
such as reducing key distribution and enhancing key security. There are three primary 
reasons for the use of dynamic keys in sensitive information protection. 
First, securing sensitive information by using long-term symmetric keys makes sensitive 
information systems more vulnerable to adversaries. In contrast, using dynamic keys makes 
attacks more difficult. Second, most sound encryption algorithms require cryptographic 
keys to be distributed securely before enciphering takes place. However, key distribution is 
one of the weaknesses of symmetric key algorithms. Although asymmetric key algorithms 
do not require key distribution, they are, in general, slow and susceptible to brute force key 
search attack. This situation can be improved by using asymmetric key algorithms once only 
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to distribute an encrypted secret. Dynamic keys can then be generated based on the secret 
and other key materials. This process can improve the overall security considerably. Last, 
but not least, security tokens can be generated by either long-term symmetric keys or nonce 
dynamic keys. Even though both methods generate variational tokens every time, the 
dynamic key method is more difficult to break than the long-term key method. 
In accordance with the primary reasons for using dynamic keys in sensitive information 
protection, it is necessary to have an unambiguous and formal definition. The notion of a 
one-way function (Menezes et al., 1996) is used for reference. This is defined as “... a 
function f such that for each x in the domain of f , it is easy to compute ( )f x ; but for 
essentially all y  in the range of f , it is computationally infeasible to find any x  such that 
( )y f x= .”  Formally, a function * *:{0,1} {0,1}f →  is one way if, and only if, f  is 
polynomial time computable, and for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the 
probability that A successfully inverts ( )f x , for random | |{0,1} xRx ∈ , is negligible (Talbot & 
Welsh, 2006). Therefore, dynamic keys can be defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1 (Dynamic Keys) Dynamic keys { | }iDK dk i N= ∈ are synchronously offline 
generated by a special one-way function (.)f  in two entities P and Q  based on a form of 
pre-shared secret ( s ). Concisely:  
 { ( ) | }iDK f forms of s i= ∈`   (1) 
where, 
 , ( ), ( ( ) ( ))i ix y x y f x f y∀ ≠ ¬ ∃ =   (2) 
The special one-way function dynamic key generation scheme (Kungpisdan et al., 2005; Li & 
Zhang, 2004) has been proposed. However, the formal proofs have never been given; 
consequently, having formally defined dynamic keys, the cryptographic properties of 
dynamic keys are discussed and proved. 
One of the most important security requirements of dynamic keys theory is key freshness. 
This means a generated dynamic key must be guaranteed to be new and able to be used 
only once. Furthermore, a dynamic key should be known only to involved entities. 
Therefore, four important security properties of dynamic keys (dynamic key secrecy, former 
key secrecy, key collision resistance and key consistency) are given. 
Suppose that a set of dynamic keys is generated n times and the sequence of successive 
dynamic keys is 1 2{ , ,..., }nDK dk dk dk=  and (.)f is a special one-way function to generate 
DK. The properties are: 
Theorem 2.1 (Dynamic Key Secrecy) Dynamic key secrecy guarantees that it is 
computationally infeasible for an adversary to discover any dynamic key , ii dk DK∀ ∈ ∈` . 
Proof: From the definition it is apparent that the key generation algorithm is a one-way 
function. The dynamic key generation function therefore inherits the properties of the one-
way function with the consequence that “for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, 
the probability that A successfully inverts ( )f x , for random | |{0,1} xRx ∈ , is negligible”. Thus, 
it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to discover any dynamic key.      □     
Theorem 2.2 (Former Key Secrecy) Former key secrecy ensures that an adversary, who 
knows a contiguous subset of used dynamic keys (say 0 1{ , ... }idk dk dk ), cannot discover any 
subsequent dynamic keys jdk , where jdk is the newest generated and  i j< .   
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Proof: Assuming n dynamic keys, let iB  denote the event of selecting a dynamic key from 
dynamic key i  ( idk ). Notice that 
1
n
i
i
B
=
∑  form a partition of the sample space for the 
experiment of selecting a dynamic key. Let A denote the event that the selected dynamic key 
is compromised. Therefore, based on Bayes’ rule, the probability that jdk  is compromised is 
1
( ) ( | )
( | )
( ) ( | )
j j
j n
i i
i
Pr B Pr A B
Pr B A
Pr B Pr A B
=
=
∑
. According to the argument in the proof of Theorem 2.1, it is 
computationally infeasible for an adversary to discover any dynamic key. In other words, 
given a fresh dynamic key jdk , the probability of this key being compromised is 
( | ) 0jPr A B = , and ( | ) 0jPr B A = .  Even if a contiguous subset of used dynamic keys 
becomes known, the security of subsequent fresh keys will not be affected.      □ 
Theorem 2.3 (Key Collision Resistance) Key collision resistance means that given a 
dynamic key generation algorithm, (.)f , and two initial seeds, XS  and YS ( X YS S≠ ),  the 
probability of key collision is negligible.   
Proof: Let λ  be the probability of dynamic key collision with two different initial seeds. The 
probability of no key collision can then be characterized by a Poisson Distribution 
(Scheaffer, 1994): ( ) , 0,1,2...
!
y
Pr y e y
y
−λλ
= = .  Where 0y = , no key collision event can occur 
and  we have
0
(0)
0!
Pr e e−λ −λ
λ
= = .  Since ( )f x is a special one-way function, then the 
probability of (0)Pr  converges towards 1 and 0λ ≈ . The value is negligible and completes 
the proof.                                                                                                                                   □ 
Theorem 2.4 (Key Consistency) Key consistency guarantees to produce sequential, 
consistent, dynamic keys DK, if given the same (.)f and an initial seed. 
Proof: Given the same (.)f and an initial seed, two entities P and Q can generate one set of 
dynamic keys.  Let B  denote the event of having distinct initial seeds for two entities. B  is 
the complement of B , which has same initial seeds for both entities. Let A  denote the event 
of producing the same output under (.)f . From Theorem 2.3, the probability of the two 
distinct inputs, XS  and YS , and the (.)f  producing the same output is negligible. The 
probability of producing the same output by a given (.)f  and two distinct seeds therefore 
converges towards 0. Hence, ( | ) 0Pr B A ≈ . Since B  is the complement of B , according to 
additive and multiplicative rules of probability, we have ( ) ( ) ( )Pr A Pr AB Pr AB= + . Thus, 
( | ) 1 ( | )Pr B A Pr B A= − . It follows ( | ) 1Pr B A ≈ . Therefore, given the same seeds and (.)f , 
the two entities can generate the same set of dynamic keys.        □ 
2.2 Security architecture  
Security architecture (SecureSIS) consists of four “tangible” components: dynamic key 
management (DKM) , user-oriented group key management (UGKM) (Wu et al., 2008b), 
authentication and authorization management (AAM) (Wu et al., 2009) and sensitive 
information management (SIM) (Wu et al., 2008a), and two “intangible” components: 
security agreement (SA) and security goals (Goals). DKM is the security foundation of 
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SecureSIS. It manages dynamic keys for other components to secure communication channel, 
user interface and sensitive information storage in the process of sensitive information 
retrieving. 
In SecureSIS, two sets of dynamic keys are employed for engaging users (U) to protect their 
sensitive information and privacy. One is dynamic data key set XDK , which is used to 
integrate with (encrypt) sensitive information at rest. Another is dynamic communication 
key set YDK , which is used to secure communication and generate tokens for 
authentication. In addition, there is no sensitive information at rest for “tangible” 
components. Hence, only one set of dynamic keys (component dynamic keys) conducts the 
security of communication channel among components.  
UGKM is a membership management in SecureSIS. It is a novel hybrid group key 
management approach to govern dynamic membership and protect user privacy and 
multicast communication secrecy. Together with DKM, unicast communication channel for 
individuals and multicast communication channel for group members are protected.    
AAM manages authentication and authorization for individuals and group members to 
protect user interface. The employment of DKM and UGKM makes the AAM secure and 
flexible to deal with group authorization, individual privacy protection. 
SIM uses dynamic data keys to integrate with sensitive information at rest in order to 
protect sensitive information storage. It guarantees the breach of SIS does not have negative 
impact on the security of sensitive information itself. Also, SIM manages sensitive 
information ownership by applying UGKM to ensure the utility of sensitive information. 
SA component guarantees the security of sensitive information in SecureSIS, if, and only if 
the sensitive information satisfies the agreement. 
Goals component is security expectations of SecureSIS. According to the process of sensitive 
information retrieving, this component consists of user interface’s goal, communication 
channel’s goal and sensitive information storage’s goal. 
In order to protect sensitive information (called I), the security architecture, SecureSIS, can 
be characterized as follows: 
Definition 2.2 (SecureSIS) Security architecture is defined as a union of the following sets: 
 , , , , , ,SecureSIS [U AAM UGKM SIM DKM SA Goals]=   (3) 
where, 
i. U is a set composed of engaged users who require sensitive information I.    
ii. AAM is a set of authentication and authorization management objects for verifying U 
and allowing U to delegate authorization in order to protect user interface. 
iii. UGKM is a user-oriented group key management object for providing secure 
communication channel in order to secure I sharing among subsets of U.  
iv. SIM is a set of sensitive information management objects for protecting sensitive 
information storage. 
v. DKM is a set of dynamic key management objects for providing and managing 
dynamic keys of U, AAM, UGKM and SIM. 
vi. SA stands for the security agreement associated with I. It is a notional inner relationship 
between U and I.   
vii. Goals represents security goals of architecture regarding I protection. 
To illustrate the conceptual architecture based on the definition of SecureSIS, AAM, UGKM, 
SIM and DKM can be thought as “tangible” objects to protect I. These objects are therefore 
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components of SecureSIS architecture. In addition, SA and Goals are “intangible”, thus, the 
tangible conceptual architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Tangible Conceptual Architecture of SecureSIS. 
The set of engaged users, U, is a key component in SecureSIS. Every user owns or shares 
sensitive information. To protect sensitive information, the security of each single user needs 
to be scrutinized. In order to protect the privacy of each individual, U is classified into two 
categories: passive users, ω , and active users, ϖ . Passive user is inert and infrequently joins 
and leaves the system. In SecureSIS, ω  does not share its own sensitive information with 
others, but accesses the sensitive information of ϖ . Active user is vigorously and frequently 
joins and leaves the system. ϖ needs to share sensitive information with ω  therefore, it 
needs high privacy protection. Meanwhile, by a request, ω can be transformed into ϖ  and 
vice versa ( ω ϖ = ∅∩ ).  
SecureSIS is split into several administrative areas. Each area has a local secure group 
controller (LSGC) associated with a subgroup to manage I sharing and accessing. The 
controllers together constitute a multicast group (UGKM) that maintains group key 
consistency by exchanging group information dynamically and securely. The 
communication structure of SecureSIS is shown in Fig.3. 
In SecureSIS, the SA is the “contract” that governs the relationships between sensitive 
information I and owners (U) in a secured transaction (for example, information accessing 
and sharing). The SA classifies sensitive information into a number of levels following 
information classification, and then assigns access rules to each information object. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The Structure of SecureSIS. 
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When designing security architecture for sensitive information systems, sensitive 
information protection is the primary consideration. Sensitive information must be stored 
safely (sensitive information storage), transmitted securely (communication channel) and made 
available only to authenticated and authorized (user interface) users. Such desires can be 
defined as security goals of SecureSIS.  
User Interface’s Goal (UIG): Sensitive information must only be disclosed to legitimate 
users with proper permissions and genuine sensitive information systems. 
Communication Channel’s Goal (CCG): Sensitive information must be identically 
maintained during transmission via open networks. 
Sensitive Information Storage’s Goal (SISG): Sensitive information must be stored 
securely and satisfy the requirement that only privileged users can understand and retrieve 
the information. 
3. Security architecture components 
3.1 Dynamic Key Management (DKM) 
The reason for the employment of two sets of dynamic keys is that dynamic data keys are 
only used to integrate into sensitive information at rest (encryption), and dynamic 
communication keys are used only for token generation and commination protection. The 
two sets of dynamic keys are independent. According to the single-use nature and 
cryptographic properties of dynamic keys, the breach of one set of dynamic keys does not 
compromise the security of SecureSIS. Formally: 
Definition 3.1 (Dynamic Key Management) Dynamic keys management is a quadruple 
, , , (.)X Y[DK DK CDK G ] , where: 
i. XDK is a set composed of dynamic data keys{ | }Xidk i ∈`  of users for securing sensitive 
information storage. Given nu U∈ , the dynamic data key set for user nu  is: 
 { . | }X Xi nDK dk u i= ∈`   (4) 
ii. YDK is a set composed of dynamic communication keys of users for protecting user 
interface and communication channel. Given nu U∈ , the dynamic communication  key 
set for user nu is:  
 { . | }Y Yj nDK dk u i= ∈`   (5) 
iii. CDK is a set composed of dynamic keys of each components for securing 
communication between DKM and AAM & SIM. Given 
,m k naam AAM dkm DKM and sim SIM∈ ∈ ∈ , the component dynamic key set for 
maam , kdkm and nsim is { . | }i mcdk aam i ∈` , { . | }j ncdk sim i ∈` and { . | }l kcdk dkm i ∈` , 
respectively. 
iv. (.)G  is a dynamic key generation scheme. It generates dynamic keys synchronously 
with U and other components in SecureSIS. 
In order to make good use of dynamic key properties, the following agreements apply: 
- For users, a user sharing XDK  and YDK  with SecureSIS does not necessarily mean that 
the user has registered and is legitimate. 
- For users, dynamic data keys do not involved in any communication. The keys are 
strictly used to wrap and unwrap sensitive information only. 
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- For both users and “tangible” objects, dynamic communication keys are used to 
generate security tokens and encipher communications. 
- For objects, dynamic communication keys of users are generated via DKM, and 
transmitted securely via dynamic communication keys of objects. 
- For both users and objects, a network failure caused by asynchronous dynamic 
communication keys will trigger a network fault heal event (Ngo et al., 2010). The event 
can be performed via negotiating dynamic key counters{ | }Yj j N∈ . 
3.2 User-oriented Group Key Management (UGKM) 
Every user in SecureSIS is managed via this component, and it applies a hierarchical 
structure to secure multicast communication channel. It is a top-down structure and consists 
of a root, subgroups (SG), clusters (C) and leaves (associated with users U).  
The passive users ω  are initially aggregated into clusters, at the upper level, called 
subgroups. Each cluster selects one of its members as the cluster leader to be the 
representative. The active users ϖ  cannot join clusters, but virtual clusters. Each virtual 
cluster is a virtual container to accommodate involved ω  and ϖ . When an active user joins, 
a member (passive user) of a closed cluster forms a virtual cluster under the same subgroup 
node. The member (passive user) is called virtual leader for the virtual cluster. The 
component is characterized as follows: 
Definition 3.2 (User-oriented Group Key Management) User-oriented group key 
management is a septuple , , , , , , ( )[ C VC L VL Alg U ]ω ϖ , where: 
i. VC (virtual cluster) is a set composed of virtual containers to accommodate involved ω  
and ϖ . An active user can only join (belong to) one virtual cluster; however, a passive 
user can belong to a subset of virtual clusters, such that,  
 
, ! :
, :
i j i j
i j i jj N
vc VC vc
at least one vc vc
∈
∀ϖ ∈ϖ ∃ ∈ ϖ ∈
∀ω ∈ω ∃ ω ∈∪   (6) 
ii. L (leader) is a set composed of leaders L ⊂ ω  for authentication as representatives of 
clusters, used in AAM.   
iii. VL (virtual leader) is a set composed of virtual leaders VL ⊂ ω  for constructing virtual 
clusters and managing key operations. 
iv. ( )Alg U is a suite of algorithms that manages U join and leave rekeying operations.    
3.2.1 Key tree structure  
As discussed in Section 1.1.1, since the drawbacks of the existing multicast communication 
channel approaches. The UGKM scheme must guarantee privacy protection for group 
members and confidentiality for sensitive information systems.  It must also be suitable for 
groups with a large number of members. Therefore, UGKM is a two-tier hybrid group key 
management that focuses on privacy protection and confidentiality of sensitive information. 
Fig.4. depicts the logical structure of UGKM.  
UGKM is divided into two levels: the passive user level (key tree distribution scheme) and 
the active user level (contributory group key management scheme). The passive user level 
consists only of passive users who participate in sensitive information sharing and accessing 
of other active users. As mentioned in Section 2.2, if a passive user wants to share its  
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Fig. 4. Logical Structure of UGKM 
sensitive information, the user must transform into an active user. When an active user joins 
the system, one of passive users will be promoted to leader to construct a dynamic virtual 
cluster under the subgroup. 
3.2.2 Member join 
In SecureSIS, users are categorized into passive and active users. Also, active users can only 
join virtual clusters. Therefore, there are three scenarios: an active user joins the system, a 
passive user joins a cluster and a passive user joins an existing virtual cluster.  
Active User Joins. When an active user ( 1ϖ  in Fig. 5) wishes to join the group, it applies the 
active user level key distribution agreement. Since a new virtual cluster is created, it does 
not need backward secrecy and the join procedure starts with an active user join request: 
i. First, 1ϖ  contacts a LSGC, and the LSGC forwards the request to AAM for 
authentication via a secure unicast channel.  
ii. After successful verification, one of the passive users (say 1ω ) is selected as a leader. 
Then 1ω  constructs a dynamic virtual cluster ivc VC∈ that connects all relevant 
members (say 2ω , 1ϖ  and 3ω ). 
 
 
Fig. 5. User Join. 
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iii. All members of ivc  then start to contribute secrets and generate a virtual cluster key. 
The key is synchronized with a LSGC for sharing sensitive information among 
members based on virtual cluster key generation algorithm.  
When an active user joins, a new virtual cluster is created and a virtual cluster key is 
contributed by all group members. The passive user (leader) has all relevant group keys and 
the LSGC knows the new virtual cluster key. Consequently, the rekeying operation does not 
take place. In other words, an active user join action does not affect whole group, and the 
virtual cluster leader takes responsibility for sensitive information forwarding. 
Passive User Joins Cluster. When a passive user (for example, mω  in Fig. 5.) wants to join 
the group, it applies the passive user level key distribution agreement. Backward secrecy 
must be guaranteed to prevent the new member from accessing previous group 
communications. The join procedure starts with passive user join request: 
i. First, mω  contacts the nearby LSGC, and the LSGC forwards the request to AAM for 
authentication via a secure unicast channel. 
ii. After successful verification, the LSGC updates group keys for backward secrecy and 
unicast the new group keys for mω encrypted by the dynamic communication key of 
mω . 
Passive User Joins Existing Virtual Cluster. If a passive user ( mω  in Fig. 5.) wants to join an 
existing virtual cluster, it needs to apply contributory group key management. For 
backward secrecy, the old virtual cluster key must be replaced with new contributed key: 
i. First, mω  contacts the nearby LSGC and the LSGC forwards the request to AAM for 
authentication via a secure unicast channel.  
ii. After successful verification, a new virtual cluster key is generated by the leader and 
mω via the virtual cluster key generation algorithm.  
iii. Once the new virtual cluster key is generated the leader broadcasts the new keys in the 
virtual cluster and informs the LSGC.  
No matter whether the joining user is active or passive, if the user wishes to join a virtual 
cluster, contributory group key management is applied. Therefore, no rekeying operation 
occurs. To protect the privacy of active users, when a passive user wants to join an existing 
virtual cluster, the passive user needs access permission from the active user in the virtual 
cluster.  
3.2.3 Member leave 
Similar to the join operation, there are three scenarios for the member leave operation: an 
active user leaves the system, a passive user leaves the system or a passive user leaves an 
existing virtual cluster. 
Active User Leaves.  Suppose an active user ( 1ϖ  in Fig. 5) wants to leave the system. It does 
not need forward secrecy, because virtual clusters are containers for active users. When the 
active user leaves, the virtual cluster is destroyed.  
Passive User Leaves Cluster.  If a passive user (for example, mω  in Fig. 5) wants to leave 
cluster, it needs to apply a passive user level key distribution agreement. Forward secrecy 
must be guaranteed to prevent the leaving user from accessing future group 
communications. The leave operation begins with a passive user leave request: 
i. First, mω  sends a leave request to the LSGC. 
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ii. Upon receipt, the LSGC triggers a key update for other group members and unicasts 
new group keys to the involved cluster users with their dynamic communication keys. 
Passive User Leaves Existing Virtual Cluster.  If a passive user (for example, 3ω  in Fig. 5) 
wants to leave the virtual cluster, the virtual cluster will not be destroyed (which is the case 
should an active member leave). However, to ensure backward secrecy, the virtual cluster 
key needs to be updated. This action does not affect other group members. 
i. First, 3ω sends a leave request to the leader 1ω . 1ω  removes 3ω from the member list 
and then updates LSGC.  
ii. The LSGC then triggers the virtual cluster key generation algorithm to generate a new 
virtual cluster keys with existing members in the virtual cluster.  
Passive users leaving several virtual clusters at the same time follow the procedure for this 
algorithm. However, when the passive user wants to leave the system, the procedure will 
apply group key tree management. Because the passive user does not “provide” sensitive 
information for virtual cluster members, the passive user does not have any impact on the 
virtual cluster. For forward secrecy, only a new virtual cluster key is required.  
3.2.4 Periodic rekeying operation 
The periodic rekeying operation is a process to renew group keys in the system for security 
purposes. It does not relate to either join or leave key operations. After a period of time, the 
group keys become vulnerable to key compromise and cryptanalysis attacks. This operation 
helps the system to reduce those risks. Because active users know virtual cluster keys rather 
than group keys, the periodic rekeying operation applies to passive users only.  
3.3 Authentication and authorization management 
Authentication and authorization are two interrelated concepts that form the security 
component of user interface. This component conducts security by co-operating with UGKM 
and DKM. It can be characterized as follows: 
Definition 3.3 (Authentication and Authorization Management AAM) Authentication and 
authorization management is a quadruple i j[U,EID,Proto,v(u ,eid )] , where: 
i. EID is a set composed of enciphered identities for all registered users U. 
ii. Proto is a set composed of protocols for authenticating the legitimacy of U and allowing 
U to delegate authorization in SecureSIS. (It consists of Initialization, Logon and 
AccessAuth, a suite of protocols). 
iii. ( , )i jv u eid  is a verification function that associates a Boolean value with a user 
iu U∈ and an enciphered identity ieid EID∈ . Such checking defines the legitimacy of a 
user iu  with regard to the jeid . 
3.3.1 Initialization protocol 
For every user registered in the system, the LSGC generates a unique random identity 
associated with the user. Separate from dynamic keys management, the unique identity 
generation takes place only in the LSGC. Given aam AAM∈ (an authentication and 
authorization management object) and dkm DKM∈ (a dynamic key management object), the 
protocol is described as follows: 
i. A user iu U∈ registers with the system, dkm generates a unique random identity iid  for 
the user iu  and two unique random secrets. (The two unique secrets are secretly 
www.intechopen.com
Security Architecture for Sensitive Information Systems 
 
253 
distributed to the user iu  for generating dynamic communication keys and dynamic 
data keys.) 
ii. dkm uses the hash value of the first dynamic communication key and index i  of the 
user to encipher the unique number as ieid . Precisely: 
 0
1
{ } ( , . )i Y i
i
EDI id h i dk u
=
=
`∪   (7) 
The generation of iid can be varied depending on the security requirement. As suggested, 
multi-factor authentication provides stronger security for user interface. Therefore, we 
suggest that the iid  can be formed by a combination of a biometrics factor (fingerprint or 
DNA sequence), a possession factor (smart card) or a knowledge factor (passwords).  
3.3.2 Logon protocol 
Logon protocol is used as a first security shield to protect sensitive information systems. 
Once a user successfully verifies with a LSGC, the user is able to request and join a group. In 
other words, before joining a group, a user must be authenticated as a legitimate user. The 
protocol is depicted as follows: 
i. First, a user sends a request to aam AAM∈ , ( 1){ _ , ( , . )} .Y j i Yj ilogon request h i dk u dk u− . 
ii. After understanding the received packet, aam uses ( 1)( , )Y jh i dk −  as a key K to decipher 
ieid . If, and only if, the enciphered value is same as iid , then the user is legitimate, and 
the user can make further requests, such as to join a group or to access sensitive 
information.  
iii. Subsequently, aam  sends back a challenge to verify itself to the user.  
iv. When the user leaves the system, the current dynamic communication key of the user is 
used to generate a new key ( )' ( , . )Y j n iK h i dk u+= , and produce a new 
'
ieid  to replace the 
old ieid , where n is a natural number, indicating the number of messages performed 
by the user in the system ( ' {{ } ~ } 'i ieid eid K K← ). 
3.3.3 AccessAuth protocol 
The AccessAuth protocol offers an authentication and authorization mechanism for 
sensitive information sharing among groups and users. It enables privacy protection 
whereby owners can take full control of their sensitive information. The protocol also 
manages group-to-group, group-to-individual, individual-to-individual and individual-to-
group authentication and authorization. 
Before depicting the protocol, participant classification is given to clarify that participant 
mp and np  can be either a group or an individual. Formally: 
Definition 3.4 (Participant Classification PC) PC is a triple, [P,T, ]ς , where P is a set of 
participant objects and T is an enumeration of { }single,group , and : P Tς → is the 
participant classification mapping. 
When the classification type is :T single , P acts as an individual user P U⊆ . When type is 
T : group , P is representative of a cluster ic C VC∈ ∪  where P L VL⊆ ∪ . In other words, P is 
a leader of ic (a cluster or a virtual cluster). The protocol is described as follows:  
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i. mp generates a token ( 1)( _ , . )n Y j mh I request dk p− and sends it together with a request  
(sensitive information of np ) to the LSGC. Note that if mp has the status of T : group , 
the mp will be the representative (leader) of a group. 
ii. After understanding the request and verifying the token, aam in the LSGC checks for 
permission based on the security agreement (SA) of sensitive information.  
iii. After obtaining the token and query from aam, np can delegate permissions on each 
selective portion of information according to the query and generate a new token 
( ' _ , . )n Yj nh I response dk p . This token is sent back in the response message to aam to be 
ciphered by the next dynamic communication key.  
iv. When aam receives and verifies the token from np , mp is able to retrieve the sensitive 
data. If mp has the status of T : single , the sensitive information will be unicast to mp , 
otherwise, the sensitive information is multicast to the group and encrypted by the 
group key (either a cluster key or a virtual cluster key). 
3.4 Sensitive information management 
One of the most important technological challenges, that sensitive information systems 
facing today, is keeping sensitive content secure when it is shared among internal and 
external entities. In this component, dynamic keys are used to integrate with sensitive 
information I in order to help guard against the unauthorized disclosure of I. The sensitive 
information is stored in a form of cipher (encrypted sensitive information, named EI), in 
another words, no plaintext is kept in SecureSIS. Also, each I is encrypted by a different 
dynamic data key, and all these dynamic data keys are encrypted by current dynamic data 
key (encrypted dynamic data keys, named EDK). Therefore, only the owner of sensitive 
information possesses the correct and latest dynamic data key. The privacy of owner thus is 
maintained in SecureSIS. The SIM component is formally characterized as follows: 
Definition 3.5 (Sensitive Information System SIM) Sensitive information management is a 
quadruple ,[RI,CI,EL f(I)] , where: 
i.  RI is a set composed of indices for collected critical information I. 
ii.  CI is a union of sets of encrypted sensitive information (EI) and encrypted dynamic 
data keys (EDK), where, EI is produced using dynamic data keys of sensitive 
information owner nu , 
,
{ } . ,j Xi n j
i j
EI I dk u I I
∈
= ∈∪` and, EDK is generated using current 
dynamic data keys of sensitive   information owner to encrypt the keys used to encipher 
the information. It can be symbolized as: 
,
{{ . } . , ( )},Xi n XC n j j
i j
EDK dk u dk u h EI EI EI
∈
= ∈∪` . 
Meanwhile, .XC ndk u is a current dynamic data key of nu . It is specified in order to 
encrypt and decrypt the dynamic data keys (EDK). The encrypted keys are stored in the 
header of EI.   
iii. EL stands for emergency list; a set of relationship objects O . Each io O∈ contains a 
user iu U∈ , a nominated cluster nc C∈ , an allocated auditing cluster ac C∈  and an 
encrypted dynamic data key.  At the cost of triggering an automatic audit, EL is used in 
an emergency to gain access to sensitive information I of users that would normally be 
inaccessible. 
*
, , ,{ . }i n i a i XC i combine
i
EL u c c dk u K
∈
= 6 6∪` , where combineK is a combination key of 
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leaders nl and al , which represent cluster n ic 6 and a ic 6  respectively, and 
( ( , . ), ( , . ))combine Yj n Yk aK h h n dk l h a dk l= . 
iv. f(I) is a symmetric cryptographic function that employs dynamic data key .Xi jdk u  to 
encipher/decipher sensitive data I and dynamic data keys. 
3.4.1 SIM structure  
Sensitive information management objects contain encrypted sensitive information and 
other supportive information. Each record or file of a user is enciphered with different 
dynamic data keys. Letting .i jci u CI∈  be an object of CI, the structure of a SIM object is 
illustrated as in Fig. 6. 
In regard to the architecture of SecureSIS, several administration areas form a multicast 
group (UGKM) and each area is managed by a LSGC associated with a subgroup. Also, RI, 
defined in SIM, is a set of indexes for collected sensitive information. The sensitive 
information of a user can therefore be stored in different SIM objects. In other words, 
fragmented sensitive information of a user can be transferred from different geographic 
locations and located by RI.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Structure of a SIM Object. 
3.4.2 Dynamic membership operations  
When a user registers with the system, the user must agree and choose a trusted participant, 
either a joined cluster or a nominated cluster. The chosen participant will be added to the 
emergency list (EL). This confidentiality “overrides” rule allows an authenticated cluster in 
an emergency to gain access to sensitive information of users which would normally be 
inaccessible. The rule also solves the problem of information accessibility when a user 
permanently leaves the system. In other words, dynamic ownership of sensitive information 
is provided.   
Meanwhile, the maintenance of the list EL is important. EL Update is an operation that 
updates the new nominated cluster or encrypted dynamic data keys to a relationship 
object io O∈ . There are two events to trigger EL update. First, when a user requests a change 
of the nominated trust cluster, the system will allocate a new audit cluster and generate a 
new combination key by leaders of the new nominated cluster and the allocated audit 
cluster. Second, when the dynamic communication keys of the leaders are changed, the 
encrypted user dynamic data keys will be updated. The EL update operation ensures the list 
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is up-to-date in order for it to be used for authentication in emergency access situations or 
when the user permanently leaves. 
Emergency Access. It is necessary when a user is not able to authenticate with the system and 
the user has authorized the nominated cluster as a trust participant. In an emergency 
circumstance, the user’s sensitive information can be accessed via the attendant audit cluster.  
Given nc C VC∈ ∪ as a nominated cluster for user nu U∈ and ac C∈ as an audit cluster, we 
have n nl c∈ and a al c∈  as a leader of corresponding clusters. For an emergency access, the 
procedure is described as follows: 
i. An emergency access event occurs. 
ii. The leader of the nominated cluster sends a request to the system together with a token. 
iii. The system looks at the EL and sends a request to the corresponding audit cluster in 
order to have a response and a token. 
iv. After the system gathers two tokens from the nominated and audit clusters, the system 
will recover user nu dynamic data key and encipher it with the dynamic communication 
key of nl . The sensitive information of user nu will then be sent to the nominated 
cluster nc . 
User Permanently Leaves. When a user permanently leaves the system, the user either 
removes selected owned sensitive information or leaves it as “orphan” information. When 
orphan information exists in the system, the nominated cluster takes control of the 
information.  
The procedure is the same as in the emergency access procedure steps i-iii. The last step is to 
use the dynamic data key of the leader nl to encipher the leaving user’s dynamic data keys.  
4. Security analysis and discussion on secureSIS 
4.1 Security of DKM 
Definition 3.1 demonstrates that two sets of dynamic keys are necessary to ensure security 
when protecting the sensitive information of users. The dynamic communication key set 
{ | }Yjdk j ∈` protects communication channel and user interface, while the dynamic data key 
set { | }Xidk i ∈` secures sensitive information storage.  
Because dynamic keys possess dynamic key secrecy, former key secrecy and key collision 
resistance properties, a corollary can be made. 
Corollary 4.1 Because SecureSIS uses two sets of dynamic keys, even if one set of dynamic 
keys were to be disclosed, the security of the proposed system would not be compromised. 
Proof: Based on mutual information,
( ; )
( ; ) ( ; ) log( )
( ) ( )
Pr A B
I A B Pr A B
Pr A P B
=∑ ,  if XA DK= and 
YB DK= , then we have
( ; )
( ; ) ( ; ) log( )
( ) ( )
X Y
X Y X Y
X Y
Pr DK DK
I DK DK Pr DK DK
Pr DK P DK
=∑ , and, 
according to key collision resistance, the probability of dynamic keys collision is negligible. 
In other words, generated two sets of dynamic keys with two independent unique seeds 
guarantee that XDK is independent of YDK . Hence, according to probability theory, if, and 
only if A and B are independent, will ( ; ) ( ) ( )X Y X YP DK DK P DK P DK= . If that is the case, then, 
we have 
( ; )
( ; ) ( ; ) log( ) 0
( ) ( )
X Y
X Y X Y
X Y
Pr DK DK
I DK DK Pr DK DK
Pr DK P DK
= =∑ , which is equivalent to 
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saying that one disclosed set of dynamic keys cannot reveal any information about another 
set of dynamic keys.                 □ 
Because a set of dynamic keys has no impact on another set of dynamic keys in DKM, a 
corollary can be claimed. 
Corollary 4.2 The use of two sets of dynamic keys in SecureSIS can achieve intrusion 
detection and prevention. 
Proof: Let A  denote an adversary.  By observing network traffic, A  obtains a subset of used 
dynamic keys and a number of used tokens. According to dynamic key secrecy and former 
key secrecy, new dynamic keys are computationally infeasible based on obtained keys and 
tokens. Should A  try to penetrate the system with obtained information, the action will be 
detected immediately, because dynamic keys can only be used once. In addition, although 
the actions of A  compromise one set of dynamic keys, because of Corollary 4.1, the other set 
of dynamic keys will still be secure and unaffected.  The security of the sensitive information 
is maintained and the proof is complete.           □ 
4.2 Security of UGKM 
Group key secrecy renders the discovery of any group key computationally infeasible for a 
passive adversary. In UGKM, group keys are generated by the key server (DKM) randomly 
in the passive user tier; this guarantees group key secrecy. However, in the active user tier, 
as defined, all active users belong to virtual clusters, and contributory group key 
management is applied to secure multicasting critical contents. The discussion in Section 3.2 
on group keys gives an algorithm that generates virtual cluster keys for all involved 
members; a corollary can now be devised to show that UGKM also has a group key secrecy 
feature. 
Corollary 4.3 The contributed virtual cluster key is computational infeasible. 
Proof: Assume a virtual cluster nvc VC∈  consists of one active user mϖ and n-1 passive 
users , { , }n n m ivc VC vc involved∈ = ϖ ω∑ . The virtual cluster key vcK is formed by contributing 
the intermediate key ( . ) mod i Yj iik f dk u p= (the dynamic communication key) of each 
user i nu vc∈ . Let K and IK be virtual cluster keys and intermediate key spaces respectively. 
Then, if an adversary obtains all intermediate keys { | }iIK ik i= ∈` , the probability of 
breaching the contributed vcK is: 
 1 2( | ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ... ( ; )vc vc vc nPr K IK Pr K K IK ik Pr K K IK ik Pr K K IK ik= = = + = = + + = =  (8) 
 Thus we have, 
1 1
( | ) ( ; ) ( | ) ( )
n n
vc i vc i i
i i
Pr K IK Pr K K IK ik Pr K K IK ik Pr IK ik
= =
= = = = = = =∑ ∑ . The 
contributed secret .Yj idk u has all the cryptographic properties of dynamic keys and the 
special function (.)f  has the property of , ( ), ( ) ( )x y x y f x f y∀ ≠ ¬∃ =  (Definition 2.1). 
Therefore, the probability of generating each intermediate key ( . ) mod i Yj iik f dk u p= is 
1
p
. In 
other words, the generated intermediate key is uniformly distributed over the interval 
[0, 1]p − , and we have 
1
( )iPr IK ik
p
= = . Therefore, Eq. 8 is 1
1
1
( ( ... ) | )
n
n i
i
Pr K f ik ik IK ik
p
=
= =∑ . 
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There are n intermediate keys in nvc , so, given an intermediate key, the probability of 
guessing 1
1
( ... | )n iPr K ik ik IK ik
n
= = = . Thus, 
1
1 1 1
( | )
n
i
Pr K IK
p n p
=
= =∑ . The contributed 
virtual cluster key vcKΚ = is therefore uniformly distributed over the interval [0, ]p - 1 . The 
contributed virtual cluster key is computationally infeasible; the proof is complete.     □ 
Forward secrecy guarantees that knowledge of a contiguous subset of old group keys will 
not enable the discovery of any subsequent group keys. In other words, forward secrecy 
prevents users who have left the group from accessing future group communication. 
Forward secrecy is demonstrated in the active user tier by the member leave operation.   
In the active user leave operation, each virtual cluster has only one active user and the 
existence of the active user determines the existence of the virtual cluster. When the active 
user leaves the virtual cluster, the cluster is destroyed. Operations involving active users 
consequently do not need forward secrecy. However, when a passive user leaves an existing 
virtual cluster, forward secrecy is necessary. As described in Section 3.2.3, a corollary can be 
made. 
Corollary 4.4 Forward secrecy is guaranteed in virtual clusters. 
Proof: Suppose nω is a former virtual cluster member. Whenever a leaving event occurs as a 
result of a passive user leaving an existing virtual cluster operation, a new vcK is refreshed, 
and all keys known to leaving member nω  will be changed accordingly. The probability of 
nω knowing the new vcK  is (  | )vc vcPr new K K . According to Corollary 4.3, virtual cluster keys 
are uniformly distributed. The old vcK and new vcK  are therefore independent and we have 
(  , ) (  ) ( )vc vc vc vcPr new K K Pr new K Pr K= , then (  | ) (  )vc vc vcPr new K K Pr new K= . Therefore, the 
probability of knowing the old vcK and being able to use it to find the new vcK is the same as 
finding the new vcK . In other words, nω has the same level of information of the new virtual 
cluster key as an adversary. Forward secrecy is satisfied in operations involving virtual 
clusters; the proof is complete.                □ 
Backward secrecy ensures that a new member who knows the current group key cannot 
derive any previous group key. In other words, backward secrecy prevents new joining 
users from accessing previous group content. Backward secrecy is achieved in the active 
user tier through the member join operation. In the active user join operation, when an 
active user joins the group, a new virtual cluster is created and consequently there are no 
previous virtual cluster keys to be taken into consideration; in this situation, backward 
secrecy is not a concern.  However, when a passive user joins an existing virtual cluster 
operation, backward secrecy needs to be considered. As described in Section 3.2.4, a 
corollary can be made. 
Corollary 4.5 Backward secrecy is guaranteed in virtual clusters. 
Proof: Similar as Corollary 4.4.  
4.3 Security of AAM 
The proposed AAM manages the security of SecureSIS by adopting DKM and UGKM to 
protect user interface. It allows users to authenticate themselves to have fine-grain control 
over portions of their critical information. AAM offers secure authentication and flexible 
authorization for individuals and group members. AAM consists of an Initialization 
protocol, a Logon protocol and the AccessAuth protocol. In this section, the Logon protocol, 
as a representative, is examined to show the security in user interface protection.  
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In order to verify the security of each protocol, Spi calculus (Abadi, 1999; Abadi & Gordon, 
1997) is used to evaluate the security of AAM. The approach is to test that a process 
( )P x does not leak the input x if a second process Q cannot distinguish running in parallel 
with ( )P M from running in parallel with ( )P N , for every M and N. In other words, 
( )P M and ( )P N are indistinguishable for the process Q .  
In order to investigate the Logon protocol, the protocol needs to be first abstracted into Spi 
calculus: 
i. ( 1):{ _ , ( , . )} .i Y j i Yj iu aam logon req h i dk u dk u−→  on ,ua uac c C∈ . 
ii. :{ _ , } .laam dkm key req i cdk aam→  on ,ad adv v V∈ . 
iii. 1:{ . } .Yj i ldkm aam dk u cdk aam+→  on ,da dav v V∈ . 
iv. ( 1):{ _ , ( _ , . )} .i Yj i Y j iaam u logon req h logon req dk u dk u+→  on ,au auc c C∈ . 
It is assumed there are n users and each user has a public input channel (C). Informally, an 
instance of the protocol is determined by a choice of involved entities. More formally, an 
instance is a triple , ,[w t I] such that w and t are entities, such as users and SecureSIS 
component objects, and I is a message. Moreover, F is an abstraction representing the 
behaviours of any entities after receipt of the message from the protocol. Meanwhile, 
messages between aam and dkm occur in private communication channels (V) (steps ii and 
iii). The proof is the same as the public communication channels steps i and iv. Therefore, in 
this discussion, the proof of messages i and iv is given. In the Spi calculus description of the 
Logon protocol, given an instance (w, t, I), the following process corresponds to the role of 
users and the LSGC (AAM and DKM). 
 
, _
 [ ][ . ]
w t wt Y(j -1) w Yj w tw cipher cipher
p Y(j+1) w nonce p nonce Yj w
Send c {logon req,h(w,dk .u )}dk .u | c (x ).case x  of  
{x,H(y )}dk .u in let (x, y )= y in x is logon_req y is dk u  in F
JJG
 (9) 
The process ,w tSend  describes one entity (users) processing an output message i) in parallel 
with an input message iv). It is a process parameterised by entities w  and t . Formally, we 
view ,w tSend  as a function that map entities w  and t to processes, called abstractions, and 
treat w  and t  on the left of   as bound parameters. For the process tRecv , it describes one 
entity (LSGC) processing an input message iv) in parallel with an output message i).  
 
1 1 1
1
( 1) ( 1)
( ).   { , ( )} . ( , )
[ ][ . ] | { , ( _ , . )} .
t wt cipher cipher p Yj w nonce p
nonce Y j w tw Yj w Y j w
Recv c y case y  of x H y dk u in let x y y
in x is w y is dk u c logon_req h logon req dk u dk u
− +
=
JJG   (10) 
The processes 1( ... )mSys I I  describes the whole protocol (message i and iv) with m instances. 
The channels wtc and twc are public channels. The processes send a logon request under the 
dynamic communication key Yj wdk .u  and receive LSGC challenge information under the 
dynamic communication key ( 1).Y j wdk u+ . Besides, ( . )Yj wvdk u and ( 1)( . )Y j wvdk u+ achieve the 
effect that only entity w  and t have the dynamic communication keys. Let 
1.. xx m
P
∈∪ be 
m way− composition 1 mP P| ... | , and ( 1)( . )( . )Yj wx Y j wxvdk u vdk u+  stand for 
1 ( 1) 1 ( 1)( . )...( . )( . )...( . )Yj w Yj wm Y j w Y j wmvdk u vdk u vdk u vdk u+ + we have: 
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 1 ( 1) ,1..( ... ) ( )( )( . )( . ){ ( | ! )}m wt tw Yj wx Y j wx wx tx txx mSys I I c c vdk u vdk u Send Recv+ ∈ ∪   (11) 
The replication of the receiving processes 
1..
! txx m Recv∈∪ means that every entity is ready to 
play the role of receiver in any number of runs of the protocol in parallel. Therefore, the 
protocol can be simultaneous, even though same entity may be involved in many instances. 
We now examine one instance of the protocol. Let ≡  be structural equivalence by 
combining Eq. 9 and 10, we have Eq. 11 rewritten as: 
1 1 1
( 1)
1
( 1)
( . )( . ) ( ).  { , ( )} . ( , )
( )( . ) | _ |
Yj w Y j w wt cipher cipher p Yj w nonce p
nonce Y j w wt Y(j -1) w Yj w
tw cipher cipher
Sys vdk u vdk u c y case y  of x H y dk u in let x y y
in x is w y is dk u c {logon req,h(w,dk .u )}dk .u
c (x ).case x  of {x,H(
+
−
≡ =
JJG
( 1)
 
( )( . ) | { , ( _ , . )} .
p Y(j+1) w nonce p
nonce Yj w tw Yj w Y j w
y )}dk .u in let (x, y )= y
in x is logon_req y is dk u in F c logon_req h logon req dk u dk u+
JJG
 (12) 
Based on the reaction relation and reduction relation rules,  
 
( 1)( . )( . ) ( _ , ( _ , . ), ( ))
( _ , ( _ , . ), ( ))
Yj w Y j w Yj w Y(j -1) w
Yj w Y(j -1) w
Sys vdk u vdk u F logon req h logon req dk u h w,dk .u
F logon req h logon req dk u h w,dk .u
+6
6   (13) 
The processes have not revealed the information of logon_req and tokens. In the Logon 
protocol, the tokens are generated with the dynamic communication keys of users. 
According to the cryptographic properties of dynamic keys, the dynamic communication 
keys of users are equivalent to random numbers as well as the tokens. Consequently, a 
specification is given by revising the protocol. After applying reaction relation and 
reduction relation rules, we have ( _ , , )specSys F logon req random random6 . This is equivalent 
to Sys  (noted as 1 1( ... ) ( ... )m m specSys I I Sys I I ). In other words, 1( ... )mSys I I  and 1( ... )m specSys I I  
are indistinguishable to an adversary.  Thus this protocol has two important properties as 
proved: 
- Authenticity: entity B  always applies F  to the message that entity A sends, and an 
adversary cannot cause entity B  to apply F to other messages. In other words, 
1 1( ... ) ( ... )m m specSys I I Sys I I  for any message. 
- Secrecy:  The message cannot be read in transit from entity A  to entity B , if, and only if 
F does not reveal the message, then the whole protocol does not reveal the message. 
4.4 Security of SIM 
The security of SIM is conducted by two sets of dynamic keys. The first set of dynamic keys 
(dynamic communication keys) is a security shield that is used to protect communication 
channel and user interface. The second set of dynamic keys (dynamic data keys) is the security 
core of SIM. This set only protects sensitive information storage and integrates with sensitive 
information stored in cipher form; it is never involved in the protection of communication 
channel and user interface. 
According to Section 3.4, SIM offers the following security features: 
- Every data entry operation yields different EI. 
- Every transaction triggers EDK updates. 
- Any data altered results in a new EI and a new set of EDK. 
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- Only the owner of sensitive data has the correct dynamic key to decipher the data. 
- Only in an emergency circumstance is a nominated cluster, overseen by an auditing 
cluster, able to access the sensitive information of users. 
- Any “orphan” sensitive information is managed by a nominated cluster overseen by an 
auditing cluster. 
Intuitively, because the above facts protect sensitive information in storage, it would appear 
that sensitive information is secure and protected, even should the storage be breached. 
Therefore, a corollary can be made. 
Corollary 4.6 Even if the security of one user is breached in SIM, the security of other users 
and sensitive information will not be compromised. 
Proof: Suppose that S is a sample space possessing enciphered sensitive information. Events 
1 2, ,... nB B B  partition S, and we have 1 2 ... nB B B S=∪ ∪ ∪ . Due to SIM security features, the 
occurrence of events iB and jB  are independent. Therefore, i jB B = ∅  for any pair i and j. 
Let jB denote the event that disclosed information comes from user ju and ( ) 0,iPr B i> ∈` . 
Let A denote the event that the sensitive information is compromised. According to the 
conditional probability of compromised information jB given event A is one, ( | ) 1jPr B A = . 
Apply Bayes’ law, we have:  
 
1
( ) ( | )
( | )
( | )
j j
j n
i i
i
Pr B Pr A B
Pr B A
Pr(B )Pr A B
=
=
∑
  (14) 
and thus, 
 
1
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1
( ) ( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | ) ...+
( | ) ( | ) ...+
                              ( | ) ( | )
n
j j i i
i
j j j j
n n n n
Pr B Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B
Pr(B )Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B
Pr(B )Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B
Pr(B )Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B
=
+ +
− −
=
= + +
+ +
+
∑
 (15) 
and then, 
  1 1 1 1 1 1( | ) ... ( | ) ( | ) ... ( | ) 0j j j j n nPr(B )Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B Pr(B )Pr A B− − + ++ + + + + = (16) 
Since, ( ) 0iPr B∀ > , then conditional probability of compromising sensitive information of 
others is zero. We have 1 1 1( | ) ... ( | ) ( | ) ... ( | ) 0j j nPr A B Pr A B Pr A B Pr A B− ++ + + + + = . Therefore, 
even when one user is compromised in SIM, the probability of breaching other sensitive 
information is zero; the proof is complete.                □ 
4.5 SecureSIS goals discussion 
Based on the proofs of Theorems 2.1-2.4 and Corollaries 4.1-4.6, the proposed security 
architecture satisfies the security requirements. By using the theorems and corollaries 
already presented, in this section, we prove that SecureSIS also meets its intended security 
goals. 
Proof of User Interface’s Goal.  User interface is protected by a combination of AAM, DKM 
and UGKM. According to the discussion on AAM, any user iu U∀ ∈  can prove iu  to 
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SecureSIS by adopting dynamic communication keys securely. Also, for any sensitive 
information iI I∀ ∈ , if the user iu provides proof to SecureSIS with full permission to iI , then 
the user iu  possesses the information.  In addition, if user iu  possesses the information, 
then iu has full control of it. Moreover, the Logon protocol in AAM, which guarantees that, 
as long as there is a correlated token (signature), SecureSIS will believe that the action is 
performed by user iu . Furthermore, as was discussed in the Logon protocol on AAM a 
challenge-response message is returned by using the dynamic communication key of user 
iu  to generate a token in order to verify the genuineness of SecureSIS. According to the 
cryptographic properties of dynamic keys and the security of AAM, sensitive information is 
only disclosed to legitimate users with proper permissions and genuine SecureSIS.     □ 
Proof of Communication Channel’s Goal. The security of communication channel is 
managed by the use of dynamic communication keys (DKM) and group keys (UGKM). As 
discussed in Section 3.3.3, it ensures that iu U∀ ∈  believes received sensitive information is 
identically maintained in transit. Using the AccessAuth protocol, every message among 
entities is assembled with a unique token. Because of the features of DKM and UGKM, the 
keys needed to protect communication are secure. Every message received by SecureSIS can 
then be verified. Consequently, we have that sensitive information is identically maintained 
during transmission via open networks in SecureSIS.         □ 
Proof of Sensitive Information Storage’s Goal. The security of sensitive information storage is 
attained by SIM participating with DKM and UGKM. if iu U∀ ∈ possesses the information, 
the user has full control of it. In other words, the user can decipher jEI . Hence iu believes 
possessed sensitive information is genuine in sensitive information storage, and ensures that 
sensitive information is stored securely and only privileged users can understand and 
retrieve sensitive information in SecureSIS.           □ 
5. Conclusion and future work 
Protecting sensitive information is a growing concern around the globe. Securing critical 
data in all sectors, including the business, healthcare and military sectors, has become the 
first priority of sensitive information management. Failing to protect this asset results in 
high costs and, more importantly, can also result in lost customers and investor confidence 
and even threaten national security. The purpose of this research was to develop a security 
architecture able to protect sensitive information systems. 
Sensitive information systems consist of three components: communication channel, user 
interface and sensitive information storage; the protection of these three components equates to 
the protection of sensitive information itself. Therefore, this research contributes to the 
development of the body of knowledge surrounding sensitive information protection. Its 
contributions include the following: 
- Formal definition and cryptographic properties proofs of dynamic keys. 
- A new proposed security architecture for sensitive information systems. 
This research has opened up avenues for further work. These include i) investigation into 
the use of dynamic keys for intrusion prevention and detection; and ii) the design and 
development of new dynamic key algorithms. 
This research has presented a security architecture that overcomes the limitations of existing 
security approaches in protecting sensitive information. The architecture has also 
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demonstrated the feature of intrusion prevention and detection by the employment of two 
sets of dynamic keys. This mechanism has yet to be studied formally and systematically. It 
could be further investigated and proposed as a new component for SecureSIS. 
Another direction for future research could involve the design of new cryptographic 
algorithms in order to enhance the security of sensitive information systems. This current 
research has enabled the formal definition of dynamic keys and regulated the cryptographic 
properties of dynamic keys. Future work might involve the testing of these definitions to 
further demonstrate their appropriateness when guiding the design of new dynamic key 
generation algorithms. 
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